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FORWARD INTO THE PAST: SPEECH
INTERMEDIARIES IN THE TELEVISION
AND INTERNET AGES
GREGORY P. MAGARIAN*
0The world is collapsing around our ears,
0I turned up the radio, but I can’t hear it.1
Communication constructs society. By speaking to, with, and among one
another, people and groups build relationships that allow us all to live more
fully, understand the world better, and govern ourselves collectively. As
societies grow, expression and engagement become more challenging. The
presence of more ideas, larger and more diverse potential audiences, and
more powerful and remote institutions threatens to reduce communication
to a futile exercise. Whatever normative goals different people and groups
may want public discourse to serve, pursuing those goals gets harder.
Communication in a society as big and complex as ours inevitably
depends on intermediation. Speech intermediaries—institutional actors in
the private sector that compile, channel, and deliver information on a masscultural scale—variously ameliorate and deepen the social problems of
communication. Speech intermediaries’ forms and qualities become crucial
determinants of how well public discourse will serve people’s and groups’
interests and what sort of society our communication will construct.
In the period before the internet, what I’ll call the Television Age, speech
intermediaries became increasingly consolidated, commanding, and
homogeneous. The three national television networks, along with the major
radio stations, daily newspapers, major film studios, book publishers, and
record labels, reserved large audiences for only a select few speakers.
Those institutions obstructed the path to a more contentious, participatory
ideal of public discourse. Government and the public managed to exert
substantial control over speech intermediaries through regulations and
norms. Most of those external controls, however, reinforced intermediaries’
homogenizing tendencies. In the Television Age, free speech values—
conventionally understood to include individual self-fulfillment, the pursuit
of truth, and effective democracy—suffered under speech intermediaries’
* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. Thanks to the editors of the
Oklahoma Law Review for organizing a fantastic symposium; to the symposium participants,
especially my co-panelists Joe Thai and Sonja West; and to workshop participants at the
Washington University School of Law.
1. R.E.M., Radio Song, on OUT OF TIME (Warner Bros. Records 1991).
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sometimes oppressive power. In particular, Television Age intermediation
stifled what I’ll call dynamic engagement: communication about varied
ideas among people with divergent identities and perspectives.
The internet, when it emerged as a social and cultural force in the 1990s,
seemed to promise an undreamed age of effective mass communication
without intermediation. People and groups could suddenly communicate
with large audiences quickly and inexpensively. Today, many more people
exchange much more information than anyone could have imagined even
twenty-five years ago. Increasingly, however, online communication carries
a familiar aftertaste. Powerful new intermediaries have emerged to undercut
the internet’s autonomous, democratizing promise. Internet service
providers (ISPs) dictate the terms on which information and users travel
online. Search engines decide what sources fill our thirst for knowledge.
Social media platforms determine with whom we engage and how.
Unlike Television Age speech intermediaries, the new intermediaries of
the Internet Age operate substantially free of effective regulatory or
normative controls. Their role in structuring public discourse reflects no
interest beyond their profit motives. The 2016 presidential election revealed
deep pathologies of online mass communication and the new speech
intermediation that structures it. The internet widens political divisions into
volcanic fissures. The term “fake news” has exploded into our national
lexicon, even as political opponents squabble about which news is fake. We
decry opinion bubbles even as we luxuriate within them. ISPs, search
engines, and social media platforms seem robust in pursuing profit but
anemic in recognizing any broader social goal. Where Television Age
intermediaries promoted homogeneity at a high cost to dynamic
engagement, Internet Age intermediaries promote social fragmentation at a
high cost to social cohesion.
Our present social and political climate reveals a paradox about speech
intermediation. On one hand, our riven political culture seems to lack, and
to need, Television Age intermediaries’ function of substantially unifying
society under a shared umbrella of cultural and political information. Critics
of Television Age speech intermediaries’ homogenizing force never
imagined a world where neighbors would lose any frame of reference for
one another’s ways of thinking. We need stronger speech intermediation!
On the other hand, Internet Age intermediaries have played a major role in
degrading public discourse. ISPs blithely open platforms to hateful and
mischievous speakers; search engines steer people toward micro-targeted
informational niches; social media platforms bind us in cultural and
political cocoons. We need weaker speech intermediation!
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The paradox of Internet Age speech intermediation makes this a useful
moment for considering what the experience of Television Age
intermediation might teach us about our present situation. As private actors,
speech intermediaries bear no First Amendment obligations while, in
theory, enjoying substantial First Amendment protections against regulatory
constraints. Television Age law and politics, however, managed to impose
social obligations on intermediaries. The Television Age experience
provides a template for imposing social obligations on the new speech
intermediaries. At the same time, the homogenizing excesses of Television
Age intermediation and regulation underscore the urgency of harnessing
Internet Age intermediaries to strike a healthier balance between dynamic
engagement and social cohesion.
I. Speech Intermediation in the Television Age
Speech intermediation is inevitable and necessary in large, complex
societies.2 Speech intermediaries, however, can vary greatly in their
characteristics and social effects. Here I describe and critique the conditions
of speech intermediation in the Television Age. The technology and profit
motives of Television Age speech intermediaries imposed prohibitive costs
for all but a few speakers to reach mass audiences. A combination of
government regulations and social pressures largely reinforced Television
Age intermediaries’ tendency to structure public discourse in ways that
promoted homogeneity while limiting the ranges of ideas and participants
in public discourse.
A. Intermediaries and the Limits of Television Age Public Discourse
The popularization of radio broadcasting in the 1930s began what we can
call the Mass Media Era, which encompasses the Television and Internet
Ages. The Mass Media Era is defined by the use of information technology
to make the same content broadly available to audiences throughout the
United States. The federal government chose to make broadcasting a
private enterprise structured by public licensure.3 That choice, placing
broadcasters on the private side of the public-private divide, had important
2. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS
PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 187–88 (1999)
(advocating careful selection and limited oversight of “trusted intermediaries”). Although
the issues discussed in this Essay know no borders, my discussion focuses on the United
States.
3. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
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consequences for First Amendment law. Similar consequences attended
other sorts of speech intermediaries that emerged in the private sphere.
The three national broadcast television networks became the dominant
institutions on the mass media landscape from the 1950s into the 1990s.
Most people during that time got the bulk of their news and entertainment
from the networks.4 All three networks followed very similar programming
approaches and practices, resulting in a high degree of similarity among
their offerings.5 Local affiliates offered some finer-grained distinctions, but
the local stations’ affiliations with the networks ensured substantial national
uniformity.6 Viewers could supplement the network and affiliate offerings
by tuning in to one or two local ultra-high-frequency (UHF) stations, but
those stations offered little original programming, and their market shares
were limited.7 Even the nominally government-run Public Broadcasting
System operated on a national network model.8
The broadcast television networks dominated the news industry. Local
affiliates typically ran half-hour primetime newscasts that focused on local
stories, followed immediately by the networks’ half-hour national news
programs.9 As late as 1993, seventy-seven percent of Americans watched
local television news broadcasts and sixty percent watched nightly network
news broadcasts.10 Adding to the uniformity of news sources, the networks
distinguished themselves primarily through the personalities of their

4. See Amanda Lotz, What Is U.S. Television Now?, 625 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI., Sept. 2009, at 51–52 (“Program options for viewers were limited to the offerings
of the three national networks . . . . Minimal choice and control characterized our viewing
experience compared with subsequent technological innovations and the modes of
engagement they allowed.”)
5. See id. at 52 (“All three networks generally pursued the same strategy, so despite the
appearance of competition, little differentiated the programs arising at any particular time.”).
6. See Marc Gunther, The Transformation of Network News: How Profitability Has
Moved Networks Out of Hard News, NIEMAN REPS., June 15, 1999, http://niemanreports.org/
articles/the-transformation-of-network-news/.
7. See id.
8. See Meredith C. Hightower, Beyond Lights and Wires in a Box: Ensuring the
Existence of Public Television, 3 J.L. POL’Y 133, 147 (1994).
9. See Gunther, supra note 6.
10. See Where Americans Go for News, PEW RES. CTR. (June 8, 2004), http://www.
people-press.org/2004/06/08/i-where-americans-go-for-news/. That network number almost
certainly understates the dominance of broadcast network news earlier in the Television
Age, as the same study shows that thirty-five percent of Americans by 1993 were getting
news from the Cable News Network (CNN).
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overwhelmingly white, male news anchors.11 They almost never presented
different ideological perspectives, demographic identities, or subject matter
expertise.12 Viewers’ newscast preferences didn’t materially alter what
information they got. The emergence of CNN in 1980 became a watershed
in the late Television Age, marking a shift toward the more varied channel
offerings of cable systems. CNN revolutionized television news by
covering stories constantly, like all-news radio stations.13 But CNN offered
no more substantive diversity than the three broadcast networks.14 Not until
the right-wing Fox News debuted in 1996 did any television news outlet
present a distinctive identity.
Newspapers and radio substantially tracked the homogenizing path of
network television. Where a large city in 1950 might have had three or four
thriving daily newspapers with competing formats, ideologies, and
strengths, by 1990 that number would have fallen to two or even one, and
national chains rather than local owners increasingly owned the survivors.15
Readers could get, at best, two counterpoised partisan takes on the day’s
events.16 The debut of USA Today in 1982 created a print analogue to the
national broadcast networks, forcing local newspapers to compete against a
verbally arid, visually appealing national paper.17 Deregulation of
ownership rules for radio stations through the late Television Age let a
small number of companies control a large number of stations throughout
the country.18 Under the technological and commercial shadow of
television, then, both the newspaper and radio industries became more like
11. See JONATHAN M. LADD, WHY AMERICANS HATE THE MEDIA AND HOW IT WORKS
66–68 (2012).
12. See id.
13. See Harold L. Erickson, Cable News Network, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cable-News-Network (last visited May 10, 2018).
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 120–22 (2004)
(discussing the decrease in the number of daily newspapers and the increase in chain
ownership).
16. See id.
17. See Christine A. Varney, Dynamic Competition in the Newspaper Industry,
NEWSPAPER ASS’N OF AM. (Mar. 21, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/dynamiccompetition-newspaper-industry.
18. See Robert Ekelund, Jr., et al., Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical
Analysis of Local and National Concentration, 43 J.L. & ECON. 157, 157 (2000)
(“[Deregulation] significantly relaxed local and national ownership restrictions, leading to a
string of multi-million-dollar mergers in the radio industry. The structure of radio markets,
once forcefully fragmented to a great extent, is now characterized by increasing levels of
concentration.” (footnote omitted)).
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television: less idiosyncratic, more national, with fewer owners providing
more uniform content.
Other sorts of speech intermediaries likewise followed the broadcast
pattern. Accelerating concentrations of ownership in the production and
distribution of books, movies, and music yielded shrinking numbers of
increasingly dominant market actors.19 Bookstores provide a dramatic
example of this trend. Starting in the 1970s and persisting through the
1990s, large chains, notably Borders and Barnes & Noble, came to
dominate the bookselling marketplace.20 The American Booksellers
Association, which represents the interests of independent bookstores, lost
more than two-thirds of its membership between 1971 and 1995, shrinking
from 5200 bookstores to 1702.21 Such contractions limited opportunities for
authors, filmmakers, and musicians to reach audiences. Opening a
bookstore or starting a record label entails a substantially lower cost of
entry than securing a broadcast license and building a network of television
stations.22 Even so, independent publishers and sellers faced ever-deepening
struggles to compete for audience attention with their much larger
competitors.23 Consolidation in the cultural production and distribution
spheres left audiences with fewer avenues for accessing cultural expression.
Various other speech intermediaries helped to shape public discourse in
the Television Age. One example, related to but distinct from this Essay’s
central story, is the intermediation of political debate by the Democratic and
Republican parties. Much like the broadcast networks and daily
newspapers, the major parties funneled political discussion toward a narrow
set of widely shared alternatives.24 As such, the parties mirrored the
homogenizing function of other Television Age speech intermediaries. The
major parties still dominate the electoral structure of the Internet Age, but
their influence over political debate has waned parallel to the decline of
other Television Age intermediaries.
19. See, e.g., ANDRE SCHIFFRIN, THE BUSINESS OF BOOKS: HOW THE INTERNATIONAL
CONGLOMERATES TOOK OVER PUBLISHING AND CHANGED THE WAY WE READ (2000).
20. See LAURA MILLER, RELUCTANT CAPITALISTS: BOOKSELLING AND THE CULTURE OF
CONSUMPTION (2006).
21. Paul Collins, Chain Reaction, VILLAGE VOICE (May 16, 2006), https://www.
villagevoice.com/2006/05/16/chain-reaction-2/.
22. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, What It Takes to Open a Bookstore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/nyregion/bookstores-opening.html.
23. See id.
24. For a discussion of the major parties’ dulling of political discourse and stifling of
electoral competition, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
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Television Age speech intermediaries were private companies that
existed to pursue profit. The dominant mass media depended substantially
on advertising revenue for their bottom lines.25 Advertising provided
essentially all the revenue for television and radio broadcasters, while
newspapers drew on a combination of advertising, subscriptions, and
newsstand sales.26 Not until the advent of pay television in the cable era did
television and radio diversify their revenue streams by charging users.27 The
importance of advertising for Television Age speech intermediaries
complicated their pursuit of profits, tying their content decisions not only to
their autonomous self-interest but also to the varied interests of their
sponsors.
B. The Social-Structuring Function of Television Age Intermediaries:
Regulation, Public Norms, and Homogeneity
Beyond their profit motives, Television Age speech intermediaries
played an important role in structuring public discourse and social
relationships.28 By dictating, and limiting, the range of information
available to audiences and of opportunities for speakers to reach audiences,
the broadcast networks and other intermediaries strongly encouraged a high
degree of homogeneity. To some extent that effect simply reflected the
limited number of intermediaries that prevailing technological and
economic conditions enabled. In addition, Television Age intermediaries’
social-structuring function complemented their profitmaking function in
various ways. For example, the broadcast networks’ avoidance of partisan
identities likely optimized their mass appeal and thus their revenues.
Intermediaries’ social-structuring function, however, often diverged from
their profit motives, mainly because external forces helped dictate how
intermediaries performed that function.
1. Federal Regulation
The strongest external driver of speech intermediaries’ social-structuring
function in the Television Age was federal regulation. Under a conventional
understanding of constitutional law, media companies are speakers with

25. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. On the relationship between social structure and public discourse, with particular
attention to the role of government in regulating speech intermediaries, see OWEN M. FISS,
LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7–30 (1996).
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First Amendment rights.29 In the Television Age, however, the U.S.
government imposed substantial public interest regulations on the most
powerful, socially influential speech intermediaries: the broadcast media. 30
The Supreme Court validated, against First Amendment challenges, two
forms of substantive broadcast regulation, while a distinct class of
structural regulations never faced any noteworthy First Amendment
challenge.
From the beginning of broadcast licensing, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) imposed a substantive bar on broadcasting certain
content presumed to be morally objectionable.31 The Burger Court upheld
these “decency” regulations against a radio broadcaster’s First Amendment
challenge.32 The Court rested its decision in large part on broadcast media’s
social influence—what the Court called the “uniquely pervasive presence”
of broadcast programming.33 A plainer account of speech intermediaries’
social-structuring function, and a more robust defense of government
efforts to direct that function toward homogeneity, is hard to imagine. The
decency regulations subjected every precinct of our morally diverse society
to a common, restrictive conception of “decency” through our most
powerful media. In industries like movies and music, where official
decency regulations would have presented clearer First Amendment
problems, governmental and societal pressure encouraged implementation
of “voluntary” rating systems.34
In addition, the Warren Court upheld the federal government’s “fairness
doctrine,” which required broadcasters to offer public affairs programming
with some balance in the points of view presented.35 In particular, Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC let the government impose on broadcasters a right
of reply for subjects of on-air criticisms.36 The Burger Court took exactly
the opposite view of a similar right-of-reply regulation that a state
government imposed on the more established, less powerful newspaper
29. Mark S. Nadel, A Technology Transparent Theory of the First Amendment and
Access to Communications Media, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 158 (1991).
30. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV.
499 (2000).
31. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978).
32. Id. at 751.
33. Id. at 748.
34. See, e.g., Matt Blitz, A Brief History of the Movie Ratings System, GIZMODO (Dec.
30, 2014), https://gizmodo.com/a-brief-history-of-the-movie-rating-system-1676334900.
35. See generally Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three
Dimensions, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845 (2008).
36. 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
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industry.37 The Burger Court, however, continued to approve legislative
access mandates to the broadcast media,38 even as the Justices scuttled any
hope Red Lion might have offered for constitutionally mandated access
rights.39 Then, as the Television Age wound down, the Rehnquist Court in
the Turner Broadcasting case declined to extend Red Lion to cable
television, though Turner still upheld a form of access regulation for cable
providers on the understanding that the regulation was content neutral.40
The most common account of Red Lion inters the case with the historical
anomaly of the finite broadcast spectrum.41 The decision’s discussion of
spectrum scarcity offers support for that account.42 At a deeper level,
though, spectrum scarcity in Red Lion was merely an element in
broadcasting’s social importance and power. Justice White’s majority
opinion considered the public’s interest in getting diverse perspectives from
the broadcast media to be a matter of constitutional weight. He emphasized
“the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of
conducting its own affairs” and found “no sanctuary in the First
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not
open to all.”43 Lee Bollinger contends that broadcasting warranted different
constitutional treatment than print media as a matter of pragmatic legal
diversification, treating one mass medium differently from others.44 The
government appears to have chosen broadcasting to bear greater public
burdens, and the Court appears to have validated that choice, specifically
because broadcasting was the most powerful, most socially important mass
medium.
37. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
38. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (rejecting a broadcast network’s
First Amendment challenge to a federal requirement that broadcasters make advertising time
available to national political candidates).
39. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973) (rejecting
political groups’ First Amendment challenge to a broadcast network’s refusal to sell them
advertising time).
40. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (deciding to
review under intermediate scrutiny a First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s requirement
that cable operators “must carry” among their channel offerings local affiliates of the
broadcast networks); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997)
(rejecting the First Amendment challenge and upholding the “must carry” regulations).
41. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Decline of the Technology-Specific
Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 266–91 (2003) (critiquing the scarcity
rationale and associating its demise with the defeat of the Red Lion doctrine).
42. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1969).
43. Id. at 392.
44. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1991).
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The fairness doctrine mandated access to the broadcast airwaves for
more speakers. In general, access mandates aim to increase participation in
public debate and broaden the ranges of ideas available to audiences.45
Access mandates thus cut against homogeneity and toward greater
dynamism in public debate. The fairness doctrine in practice, however,
presumed that public controversies present only two opposing sides, and it
compelled airing of the second side only when a broadcaster chose to air
the first. Moreover, the doctrine imposed this binary conception of public
debate on all broadcasters alike, thereby discouraging divergences among
broadcast stations even as it encouraged diversity within the stations’
programming. The doctrine likely made the airwaves more vibrant and
public spirited than broadcasters would have on their own, but its limited,
bounded model fell short of promoting a truly dynamic public discourse.
In addition to the substantive decency and diversity regulations, federal
regulators in the Television Age imposed on the broadcast media major
structural regulations, some of which affected the print media as well.
Structural regulations deal not with the content of speech but with
conditions of media ownership.46 Television Age structural regulations
included limits on ownership concentration, such as the federal bar on
cross-ownership of newspapers and television stations in the same market.47
Other structural regulations required a modicum of racial diversity in
broadcast licensure.48 These regulations never inspired serious First
Amendment challenges in the Television Age, likely because ownership
rules fit comfortably within the Supreme Court’s post-Lochner allowance
for government regulation of economic matters in the public interest.49

45. See generally Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies,
and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1373
(2007).
46. For extensive analysis of media ownership concentration and regulatory responses,
see BAGDIKIAN, supra note 15; C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY:
WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS (2007) [hereinafter BAKER, CONCENTRATION].
47. Jerome A. Barron, Structural Regulation of the Media and the Diversity Rationale,
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 555, 555 (2000).
48. See Blake D. Morant, Democracy, Choice, and the Importance of Voice in
Contemporary Media, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 967–74 (2004) (discussing the history of
broadcast regulations that mandate demographic diversity).
49. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (imposing substantive due
process constraints on economic regulations), with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538
(1934) (overruling Lochner to a substantial extent and vindicating broad government power
to regulate the economy).
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Structural regulations of Television Age intermediaries diverged from
substantive regulations in the sort of influence they exerted on public
discourse. Where substantive regulations largely reinforced Television Age
intermediaries’ promotion of homogeneity, structural regulations by their
nature encourage diversification and dynamic engagement. Television Age
intermediaries limited the range of speakers and ideas in public discourse,
but structural regulations at least ensured greater variety in who controlled
the communications infrastructure.
2. Normative Constraints and the “Public Trust” Conception of Speech
Intermediation
Beyond, and behind, government regulation of Television Age speech
intermediaries, public norms imbued intermediaries, particularly the news
media, with obligations to the people. The notion of the news media as the
“fourth estate,” an essential check on government power, exerted great
influence during this period, as manifest in Vincent Blasi’s theory that the
First Amendment empowers the news media to check abuses of government
power.50
The fourth estate idea echoes through key First Amendment decisions of
the Television Age Supreme Court. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, widely
seen as the most important free speech case of the Television Age, limited
defamation liability for criticisms of government officials.51 More
pointedly, the Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn ascribed to the
news media a responsibility to report accurately and robustly on
government actions.52 The Court during this period also found a qualified
First Amendment right of media access to criminal proceedings53 and let the
news media encroach significantly on the federal government’s national
security prerogatives.54 These decisions embodied not any precise
constitutional command, but rather a normative premise that the news
media bore a public trust to inform the people about their government and
thus needed special First Amendment protections.
Reflecting this “public trust” idea, media outlets during the Television
Age also imposed substantial constraints on their own operations by

50. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 521, 565–66 (1977).
51. 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
52. 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
53. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
54. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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adopting codes of journalistic ethics.55 Ethical codes issued from
professional associations like the Society of Professional Journalists, the
Radio-Television News Directors Association, and the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, as well as individual news outlets like the Associated
Press and Gannett.56 The ethical code of what is now the Radio Television
Digital News Association (RTDNA) shows some characteristic features of
these charters. The RTDNA Code’s Guiding Principles begin with the
statement: “Journalism’s obligation is to the public. Journalism places the
public’s interest ahead of commercial, political and personal interests.” 57
The Code states a commitment to “ethical decision-making,” prominently
including a duty to seek out divergent points of view on important stories.58
The Code then states and develops principles that distinguish journalism
from other forms of content: overriding commitments to truth and accuracy,
independence and transparency, and accountability.59
The normative conception of the news media as the fourth estate and the
media’s embrace of ethical codes largely worked with substantive media
regulations to promote uniformity in Television Age public discourse. The
news media’s check on government power pushed against a kind of
hegemony, and the RTDNA Code’s acknowledgement that “[f]or every
story of significance, there are always more than two sides” 60 shows a
greater appreciation for dynamism in public discourse than the fairness
doctrine did. Still, the fourth estate idea institutionalizes the news media
under one overarching model. News outlets all do fundamentally the same
democratic job, under a contestable account of liberalism that treats
government as distinctly threatening and the institutional media as
appropriately positioned to counter the threat. Likewise, media ethical
codes instantiate a common professional vision, under which news
organizations deserve the public’s trust because they all adhere to a
common behavioral template. The codes project, and the public comes to
expect, a journalistic posture of neutrality and objectivity. That posture

55. See Morant, supra note 48, at 951 n.23 (compiling journalistic ethical codes).
56. See id.
57. Code of Ethics, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N, https://www.rtdna.org/
content/rtdna_code_of_ethics (last visited May 29, 2018).
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
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inclines journalistic inquiry and analysis toward viewpoints broadly
accepted by social and political majorities.61
The public trust conception of the broadcast media frayed in the
deregulatory frenzy of the late Television Age. The Reagan-era FCC
abolished the fairness doctrine.62 Acquisitions and changes in corporate
control changed the cultures of the major television networks and
diminished whatever commitment to the public interest the networks had
previously internalized.63 Deregulation of media ownership began in the
late Television Age and accelerated during the Internet Age,64 from the
loosening of ownership limits in the 1996 Telecommunications Act65 to the
Trump FCC’s freeing of companies to own newspapers and broadcast
stations in the same media market.66 At the height of the Television Age,
however, the public trust conception strongly influenced how speech
intermediaries performed their social-structuring function.
* * *
Television Age speech intermediation combined several features that
undermined free speech values: a prohibitive cost of entry for most
speakers, concentrations of power over public discourse, and
homogenization of information. Leading free speech theorists of the
Television Age, particularly those concerned with the importance of robust
political debate, voiced concerns about intermediation. Alexander
Meiklejohn, the avatar of democracy-focused free speech theory,

61. For a discussion and critique of media ethical codes and professional journalistic
norms, see C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 154–63 (2002)
[hereinafter BAKER, MEDIA]; see also ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
MEDIA: ENDURING ISSUES, EMERGING DILEMMAS 125 (2008) (critiquing professional norms
in Television Age journalism as “more conducive to the needs of media owners than to
journalists or citizens”); Morant, supra note 48, at 985 (arguing that media ethical codes
don’t ensure presentation of diverse viewpoints).
62. See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (1987), aff’d, Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F. 2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
63. See Gunther, supra note 6; Lotz, supra note 4, at 52 (“The buyouts of the networks
in the mid-1980s . . . led to decreased institutional commitment to the democratic,
informational role of television as commercial goals increasingly trumped the remaining
vestiges of public service.”).
64. See, e.g., BAKER, CONCENTRATION, supra note 46 (describing and critiquing
deregulation of media ownership).
65. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
66. See Cecelia Kang, F.C.C. Opens Door to More Consolidation in TV Business, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/business/media/fcc-localtv.html.
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condemned “the commercial radio” as unworthy of First Amendment
protection.67 He couldn’t abide dominant intermediaries that failed to
present a diverse range of ideas about matters of public concern. Calls for
rights of access to mass media reflect an even more acute critique of
Television Age intermediaries’ power. Jerome Barron envisioned the mass
media as a vehicle for widespread popular engagement in a multidirectional conversation: not just diverse information but diverse
participation.68 C. Edwin Baker subjected the mass media to the tools of
political economy, showing how reliance on the free market to shape mass
media content would inevitably underproduce the material required to
satisfy either consumer preferences or democratic interests.69
Television Age speech intermediaries were large, powerful institutions
that generally limited the range of speakers and ideas in public discourse,
diminishing opportunities for dynamic engagement. They functioned both
to make profits and to structure society, and their social-structuring function
reflected constraints imposed by federal regulations and public norms. The
substance of those intermediaries’ social structuring was to promote a
homogeneous public discourse that shortchanged free speech values. We
can imagine (and some of us can remember) the daydream of Television
Age intermediation’s critics: If only we could somehow develop an
inexpensive form of mass communication that would afford many and
varied speakers access to a broad and diverse audience. Then we wouldn’t
let intermediary behemoths like the television networks flatten public
discourse as the cost of effective mass communication. Then we could just
talk to each other.
Welcome to paradise.
II. Speech Intermediation in the Internet Age
The Internet Age dawned in the mid-1990s with prophecies of a free
speech apotheosis: disintermediation. Libertarian Eugene Volokh predicted
a regime of “cheap speech” that would shift power away from
intermediaries.70 “Control over what is said and heard,” he asserted, “will
shift from intermediaries—publishers, bookstore and music store owners,

67. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 86–87 (1948).
68. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press — A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1656–60 (1967).
69. See generally BAKER, MEDIA, supra note 61.
70. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805
(1995).
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and so on—to speakers and listeners themselves. Private parties will thus
find it harder to use their market power to stifle speech.”71 Progressive Seth
Kreimer celebrated “technologies of protest” that would give political
dissidents an unprecedented capacity to reach audiences and mobilize
support.72 Technological optimists generally believed the internet would
both optimize personal autonomy and nurture a democratically fecund
environment of diverse information.73 Striking down a ham-fisted
congressional mandate of online “decency” in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme
Court inscribed cyberoptimism into law, hailing “the vast democratic
forums of the Internet.”74
The internet’s development has borne out some of the promise those
early boosters celebrated. Disintermediation, however, has proved to be a
fantasy. In the Internet Age, a new class of speech intermediaries,
highlighted by ISPs, search engines, and social media platforms, has largely
supplanted the intermediaries of the Television Age. Like the old speech
intermediaries, the new intermediaries both make profits and structure
society. In contrast to the Television Age, however, the new speech
intermediaries’ profitmaking function dominates their social-structuring
function. Internet technology greatly increases the range of potential socialstructuring outcomes from speech intermediation, but Internet Age law and
politics have kept actual outcomes within the narrow boundaries of the new
intermediaries’ self-interest. Regulation and social norms have done very
little to influence how online intermediaries structure our public discourse.
The substantive result of this arrangement sharply contrasts with the
Television Age. Rather than making society more homogeneous, Internet
Age intermediaries promote social fragmentation.
A. Internet Age Intermediaries, Profit, and the Rise of Customized Truth
The early cyberoptimists were substantially right to predict the decline of
Television Age intermediaries. The broadcast networks have become a few
islands, albeit big ones, in the enormous sea of broadband news and
71. Id. at 1807. For a similar view, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment
Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1653 (1998).
72. See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the
First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2001).
73. See, e.g., Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control:
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media,
104 YALE L.J. 1619 (1995).
74. 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). The opinion invalidating the online “decency”
requirement was penned by Justice Stevens, who two decades earlier had authored the
opinion in Pacifica that validated broadcast “decency” mandates.
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entertainment. They no longer set the terms of mass culture. The largest
U.S. radio holding company, a principal beneficiary of broadcast
deregulation, recently filed for bankruptcy in an attempt to restructure
billions of dollars in debt.75 The print editions of daily newspapers linger on
life support.76 Venerable national and international brand names—The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNN—retain prominence, but even
those giants have shed staff amid major operational and commercial
transformations.77 The political right has found a strident media voice
through outlets of Television Age form like Fox News and the Sinclair
Broadcast Group, but those outlets owe much of their success to broadband
distribution and amplification, linking them to Internet Age fellow travelers
like Breitbart and 4chan.78
Amid the husks of the old speech intermediaries, powerful new ones
have emerged. Online speech intermediaries control the technological
infrastructure required for twenty-first century communication. They
include entities as varied as the domain name system, backbone providers,
and providers of application software.79 The most ubiquitous speech
intermediaries of the Internet Age include ISPs, which let users access the
internet’s information systems; search engines, which sort through and
organize the blizzard of information available online; and social media
platforms, the most recent intermediaries to emerge in the Internet Age,
which increasingly organize interpersonal connections.80 Unlike Television
Age intermediaries, the new intermediaries enable, transmit, and amplify
communication by and among a vast range of people, with very low entry

75. See Soma Biswas & Anne Steele, iHeart Media Files for Bankruptcy, Reaches
Restructuring Agreement in Principle, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/radio-giant-iheartmedia-files-for-bankruptcy-reaches-restructuring-agree
ment-in-principle-with-investors-1521092058.
76. Michael Barthel, Despite Subscription Surges for Largest U.S. Newspapers,
Circulation and Revenue Fall for Industry Overall, PEW RES. CTR. (June 1, 2017), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/01/circulation-and-revenue-fall-for-newspaperindustry/.
77. See id.
78. Lucia Graves, This Is Sinclair, ‘The Most Dangerous US Company You’ve Never
Heard Of,’ GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/aug/17/
sinclair-news-media-fox-trump-white-house-circa-breitbart-news.
79. For a discussion of types of online speech intermediaries, see David S. Ardia, Free
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 385–89
(2010).
80. See id.
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costs.81 The internet contains many more ideas and hosts many more
speakers than any prior medium.82 At the same time, the internet depends
on a technological infrastructure far larger, more complex, and more
sophisticated than the infrastructure of broadcasting. 83 Thus, as in the
Television Age, a few extremely powerful companies dominate Internet
Age speech intermediation.
The new speech intermediaries undermine free speech values in
numerous ways. In consideration of speech intermediaries’ central role in
facilitating online communication, Congress enacted § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which grants “provider[s] or user[s]
of . . . interactive computer service[s]” sweeping immunity from liability
for harm caused by the speech they transmit or host.84 That immunity would
seem to incentivize openness to varied content. Several factors, however,
create contrary incentives for intermediaries to restrict speech. Just as
government pressure in the Television Age encouraged movie studios and
music labels to censor their output, government pressure in the Internet
Age, usually based on national security concerns, enlists ISPs as
secondhand regulators of their individual users.85 A potent incentive for
intermediaries to censor speech arises from the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act’s immunization of ISPs from copyright infringement liability
as long as they remove material the copyright holder identifies as
infringing.86 Online speech intermediaries also face increasing public
pressure to block content from neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other
hate groups.87

81. See id. at 391.
82. See id. at 385–86.
83. See id.
84. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). For discussions of § 230 immunity, see Ardia, supra
note 79; Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986 (2008).
85. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2308–14 (2014) (describing Internet Age “collateral censorship”); Seth F. Kreimer,
Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the
Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)-(d) (2012). For a discussion of censorship by ISPs pursuant
to the Act, see DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH
IN THE INTERNET AGE 17–19 (2009).
87. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435
(2011).
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Stronger than external pressures to restrict speech is the internal pressure
of the profit motive. ISPs sometimes seek to preempt controversy by
censoring politically sensitive content, including antiwar messages and
criticisms of the ISPs themselves or their commercial partners.88 More
broadly, ISPs want the power to charge different rates for different kinds
and grades of content and to deliver different access speeds to content
providers based on their abilities to pay.89 The FCC during the Obama
administration issued regulations that barred such differential treatment,
establishing a legal principle of “net neutrality.”90 Under the Trump
administration, the FCC has repealed the net neutrality regulations, freeing
ISPs to discriminate with impunity in how they manage flows of data.91
Search engines, like ISPs, play a crucial role in enabling online
communication, and they accordingly exercise formidable power.92 Search
engines’ proprietary algorithms for delivering results that satisfy users’
queries give them a marginally stronger prima facie case than ISPs for the
proposition that they exercise a kind of editorial discretion. Search engines,
however, have even deeper incentives than ISPs to compromise the free
flow of information online. Selling prime positions in search results can
bring potentially enormous profits.93 Sometimes search engines sell
positions openly, through “sponsored” results.94 That designation at least
provides transparency, although Google muddies the picture with tactics
88. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 5–11.
89. See id.
90. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr. 13,
2015). Net neutrality has prompted a voluminous academic debate. Compare, e.g., Tim Wu,
Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141
(2003) (advocating net neutrality) with Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006) (opposing net neutrality and advocating
an alternative principle of “network diversity”). For major treatments of net neutrality as a
matter of free speech concern, see NUNZIATO, supra note 86; Ellen P. Goodman, Media
Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at War with Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L.J. 1211
(2007); Moran Yemini, Mandated Net Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from
Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2008).
91. See Cecelia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html?hp
&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-columnregion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
92. See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine
Utopianism, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 188 (2006).
93. See Jennifer Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary
Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1113–15 (2007).
94. See id. at 1112.
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like restricting availability of sponsored links for controversial political
content.95 An even greater danger to open public discourse arises when
search engines disguise bought results as unbiased. Search engines may
also remove results altogether from their indexes or manipulate the rankings
of results.96 Effective regulatory checks on these practices would require
knowledge of search engines’ algorithms and other proprietary methods,
but the search engine companies have strong profit incentives to protect
their trade secrets.
Social media platforms represent the next generation of online speech
intermediaries. They establish systems and protocols to identify people with
whom one will communicate and determine what sorts of communication
one can share with those people, including short text, longer text, still
images, and moving images. Some social media platforms exercise degrees
of active control over content, as with YouTube’s varied tools for
promoting certain videos.97 Social media’s negative consequences for free
speech lie in the gulf between its limited expressive capacities and its users’
intense reliance on its services. Twitter’s cramped format (280 characters
per Tweet, doubled from 140 in late 2017) truncates any possibility of
thoughtful discussion.98 Facebook provides more space to explain ideas and
positions, but its customized interface lets users surround themselves
entirely with people who reinforce their social and political biases.99
Sometimes social media platforms deliberately push falsehood and division,
as with YouTube’s steering users toward sensationalist content through its
“up next” feature.100 Some architects of social media have strongly
condemned their creation’s corrosive effects on public discourse.101
95.
96.
97.
98.

See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 14–17.
See id. at 12–14; Chandler, supra note 93, at 1109–11.
Chandler, supra note 93, at 1124.
See Robinson Meyer, 7 Questions About Twitter’s Doubled Character Limit,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/09/ohjack-dorsey-we-love-you-get-up/541203/.
99. See John Keegan, Blue Feed, Red Feed, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2016),
http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-feed/ (showing stark differences in users’ exposure to
information depending on their ideological identities). This “filter bubble” phenomenon
affects search engines as well as social media. See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER
BUBBLE (2011).
100. See Paul Lewis, “Fiction Is Outperforming Reality”: How YouTube’s Algorithm
Distorts Truth, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/
feb/02/how-youtubes-algorithm-distorts-truth.
101. See Mike Allen, Sean Parker Unloads on Facebook: “God Only Knows What It’s
Doing to Our Children’s Brains,” AXIOS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.axios.com/seanparker-unloads-on-facebook-god-only-knows-what-its-doing-to-our-childrens-brains-15133
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The 2016 election starkly demonstrated social media’s power and
pathologies. Users soaked up selective information, much of it manifestly
false, from weaponized sources of what we can call customized truth.
Facebook’s increasing dominance in news distribution multiplied the power
of hyper-partisan websites, mainly on the right, and enabled the
proliferation of verifiably fake news.102 The Russian government
notoriously spread propaganda and disinformation on Facebook, and
Russian “trolls” also manipulated Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. 103 The
Internet Research Agency, a Russian company with Kremlin links, posted
content on Facebook that reached twenty-nine million people, who then
shared the posts with tens of millions more.104 The Internet Research
Agency also posted over one million election-related tweets via automated
Twitter accounts and created YouTube channels on which it uploaded over
1000 videos.105 Topics included contentious issues from race and religion to
gun regulation and LGBTQ+ rights.106 The Russians scattered posts and ads
on both sides of these issues, exploiting political polarization to increase
social fragmentation.107 To make matters worse, the right-wing data
analytics company Cambridge Analytica, employed by the Trump
campaign, illegally harvested tens of millions of U.S. Facebook profiles in
order to target inflammatory political advertising at specific voters.108
06792-f855e7b4-4e99-4d60-8d51-2775559c2671.html; James Vincent, Former Facebook
Exec Says Social Media Is Ripping Apart Society, VERGE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.
theverge.com/2017/12/11/16761016/former-facebook-exec-ripping-apart-society (reporting
comments of Chamath Palihapitiya).
102. See Alexis C. Madrigal, What Facebook Did to American Democracy, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebookdid/542502/.
103. See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American
Democracy), 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6–9); Mike Isaac
& Daisuke Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/technology/facebookgoogle-russia.html.
104. See Isaac & Wakabayashi, supra note 103.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See John Kruzel, Russia’s Social Media Efforts in 2016 Were Not Just False but
Inflammatory, POLITIFACT (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/
2017/dec/21/russia-social-media-2016-false-inflammatory/.
108. See Carol Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook
Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influ
ence-us-election.
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While social media platforms often tout their capacities to democratize
political communication, the 2016 election underscored their weaknesses—
particularly their inability to foster dynamic engagement.109 No ethos of
civic or social responsibility impeded social media platforms from
following their single-minded profit motive down a democratic sinkhole.
B. Internet Age Intermediaries’ Social Structuring and Its Discontents
In contrast to Television Age speech intermediaries, Internet Age
intermediaries’ profitmaking self-interest fully subsumes and defines their
social-structuring function. Law, politics, and technology have combined to
prevent external constraints on the new intermediaries. We see no online
analog to Television Age structural regulations of media ownership, let
alone substantive regulations like the fairness doctrine. Net neutrality has
set the high-water mark to date for government efforts to influence the new
speech intermediaries. Public norms have failed to constrain social media
platforms’ choices in the way the public trust idea constrained the
Television Age news media.110 Internet Age speech intermediaries haven’t
embraced anything like the journalistic ethical codes of the Television
Age.111 At most, they attempt to placate public criticism by tweaking their
algorithms and platforms in ways that do little for positive social
structuring.112 Intermediaries’ profit motives deter them from focusing on
the public good.113
109. See Madrigal, supra note 102; Sam Sanders, Did Social Media Ruin Election 2016?,
NPR, Nov. 8, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/11/08/500686320/did-social-media-ruinelection-2016. While U.S. attention has focused on Russia’s interference in our election,
other governments manipulate social media to influence domestic public opinion. See
Freedom on the Net 2017: Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy, FREEDOM
HOUSE (Nov. 2017), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2017_Final.pdf.
110. Operating norms, as Mark Tushnet has pointed out, can’t take hold in an
information environment as vastly inclusive as the Internet. See Mark Tushnet, Internet
Exceptionalism: An Overview From General Constitutional Law, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1637, 1648–51 (2015).
111. See Renee Diresta & Tristan Harris, Why Facebook and Twitter Can’t Be Trusted to
Police Themselves, POLITICO (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2017/11/01/why-facebook-and-twitter-cant-be-trusted-to-police-themselves-215775.
112. See id.; Sam Levin, “Way Too Little, Way Too Late”: Facebook’s Factcheckers Say
Effort Is Failing, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/nov/13/way-too-little-way-too-late-facebooks-fact-checkers-say-effort-is-failing; Laura
Hazard Owen, Facebook’s Newsfeed Changes Attempt to Curb the Spread of Fake News,
INT’L JOURNALISTS’ NETWORK (Jan. 19, 2018), https://ijnet.org/en/blog/facebooks-newsfeedchanges-attempt-curb-spread-fake-news.
113. See Diresta & Harris, supra note 111; Hasen, supra note 103 (manuscript at 26).
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Commentators during the early Internet Age offered prescient warnings
that the capacity to tailor our online experiences to fit our preexisting
preferences would fray the social fabric, dividing people with different
beliefs and values. Andrew Shapiro warned that news media without
intermediation could, in the manner of Kurosawa’s Rashomon, yield a
dizzying array of perspectives that would make actual states of affairs hard
to discern.114 Personalization of information sources, what Cass Sunstein
called “the Daily Me,” could lead to a paralyzing morass of polarized
disagreements over basic truths.115 These early commentators tended to
think the market, driven by user demands, would generate effective
solutions to these problems.116 Our present media environment, notably the
problems of filter bubbles, fake news, and manipulation of social media that
plagued the 2016 election, bears out these commentators’ warnings while
exposing the weakness of their laissez-faire prescriptions. Online
intermediaries’ damaging effects on public discourse—notably, though not
exclusively, their promotion of social fragmentation—have prompted calls
for subjecting the new intermediaries to some degree of legal control.
Most reformers advocate scaling back present First Amendment doctrine
to permit legislative and administrative regulation of online intermediaries.
Jack Balkin, for example, advocates a free speech regime based on a mix of
private sector initiatives and technocratic government oversight.117 In the
Internet Age, he argues, protection of free speech values won’t depend on
affirmative constitutional rights but rather on “the design of technological
systems—code—and . . . legislative and administrative schemes of
regulation, for example . . . open access requirements or the development of

114. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 188–92.
115. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 at 1, 46–96 (2007) (warning about dangers of a
fragmented information environment).
116. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 206 (positing that “[a] combination of corporate
goodwill and consumer pressure” would lead online intermediaries to steer users toward
encounters with unexpected information sources); Berman & Weitzner, supra note 73, at
1626–29 (positing the internet’s “[d]ecentralized architecture” as a sufficient mechanism to
fulfill democracy’s need for diverse information). Professor Sunstein showed some
ambivalence about regulation. Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 190–211 (arguing that
mechanisms for encouraging individual Web sites to spur critical and civic engagement
should be entirely voluntary), with Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace,
104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1795–1803 (1995) (advocating various legislative regulations of
services that provide Internet access).
117. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 52–54 (2004).
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compulsory license schemes in copyright law.”118 Several commentators
contend that ISPs should be subject to regulation as common carriers. 119
This approach, embodied in net neutrality, would roughly extend the
Supreme Court’s treatment of broadcasters in Red Lion and cable
companies in Turner to ISPs. Advocates of legislative reform have
proposed a range of regulatory strategies beyond net neutrality, including
requirements that intermediaries disclose their methods for aggregating and
presenting information120 and safeguards against intermediaries’
encroaching on users’ privacy121 and intellectual property.122
Congress has given small indications that it might consider regulatory
reform strategies to constrain online speech intermediaries. In the wake of
the 2016 election, a bipartisan group of legislators sponsored a bill that
would regulate online intermediaries like traditional media by making them
disclose who pays for political advertisements.123 The Cambridge Analytica
scandal has also led Congress to take a greater interest in social media
firms’ data practices.124
A more radical strategy for constraining the new speech intermediaries
would fundamentally recast First Amendment law to give intermediaries
affirmative constitutional obligations to promote free speech.125 Advocates
of this approach view the internet as a communications environment in
118. Id. at 54.
119. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 135–46; Sunstein, supra note 116, at 1798
(suggesting that regulation of Internet access providers as common carriers wouldn’t violate
the First Amendment); Tushnet, supra note 84, at 1010 (proposing common carrier
regulation as one appropriate form of compensation for ISPs’ statutory immunity from
liability for harms of the speech they transmit).
120. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 149–51; Chandler, supra note 93, at 1117–18.
121. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185–87 (2016).
122. See Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 235, 293–94 (2014).
123. See Steven T. Dennis, Senators Propose Social-Media Ad Rules After Months of
Russia Probes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-10-19/russia-probes-spur-lawmakers-on-election-security-social-media.
124. See, e.g., David Smith, Zuckerberg Put on Back Foot as House Grills Facebook
CEO Over User Tracking, GUARDIAN (April 11, 2018), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2018/apr/11/zuckerberg-hearing-facebook-tracking-questions-house-backfoot.
125. See Goodman, supra note 90, at 1211–17; Yemini, supra note 90, at 1–7; see also
NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 105 (contending that courts should treat ISPs as state actors).
For an extended discussion of the tensions between affirmative constitutional proposals for
access rights and constitutional allowances for access regulations, see Magarian, supra note
45.
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which multiple speech interests—of many and varied content providers,
intermediaries, and audiences—routinely conflict. First Amendment
doctrine should evolve to fit this new, complex communication ecosystem
by recognizing net neutrality, and perhaps other structural and even
substantive reforms, as mandatory preconditions for preserving expressive
freedom in the Internet Age. “[T]he real justification for network
neutrality,” contends Moran Yemini, “is content providers’, and especially
users’, own individual free-speech rights, stemming directly from the First
Amendment.”126 Such a bold shift in First Amendment doctrine would
require—and its supporters encourage—openly normative judicial
assessments of competing rights claims in challenges to structural
regulations like net neutrality.127 In Ellen Goodman’s formulation, “where
there truly are speech interests on both sides, the question [should be]
whether the government intervention is actually pro-speech or anti-speech
in ways that are constitutionally meaningful.”128 This affirmative
constitutional approach to constraining intermediaries would invert, not just
dodge, the barriers to reform erected by present First Amendment doctrine.
III. Back to the Future
Consideration of speech intermediation and its critics in the Television
and Internet Ages provides raw material for thinking through some of the
deepest challenges on our present communications landscape. In particular,
this Essay’s discussion of old and new speech intermediaries sheds some
light on the paradox of Internet Age speech intermediation. Many people
simultaneously believe that online intermediaries have too much power,
because of the various ways they degrade public discourse, and that online
speech needs stronger intermediation, because we’ve lost the relative unity
that old media intermediaries enforced during the Television Age. Lessons
from the Television Age suggest a two-part program for moving forward.
First, we should create legal space for Internet Age analogs to the
Television Age regulations that placed social policies above speech
126. Yemini, supra note 90, at 38; see also MCCHESNEY, supra note 61, at 143–45
(positing the necessity of net neutrality for the availability of quality journalism online).
127. I have advocated this sort of approach generally for cases that present conflicts
between First Amendment interests. See Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of
Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of
Participation Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185, 185–91 (2007).
128. Goodman, supra note 90, at 1258. Professor Goodman advocates an analysis akin to
rational basis review for content-neutral government regulations designed to enhance speech
opportunities. See id. at 1256–61.
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intermediaries’ profits. Second, we should push for Internet Age
intermediaries’ structuring of public discourse to strike a healthy balance
between the dynamic engagement we lacked in the Television Age and the
social cohesion we increasingly lack now.
A. First Amendment Law vs. Free Speech Principles
Our substantive aspirations for public discourse in the Internet Age will
either be borne on the wings or ground in the teeth of the First Amendment.
A regulatory program that pushed intermediaries to promote a system of
communication that served the public interest might stop at structural
regulations like net neutrality, or it might proceed through some version of
substantive regulation. Whatever form such a program took, some
intermediaries would insist it transgressed First Amendment boundaries.
Those boundaries, as a general matter, do valuable work. They embody a
well-grounded presumption that substantive government regulations of
speech are usually too ill-motivated or ill-conceived to permit.129 Should
that insight leave any room for regulation of the new speech intermediaries?
Both opponents and advocates of greater legal constraints on Internet
Age speech intermediaries agree that prevailing, libertarian First
Amendment doctrine presents strong—perhaps impregnable—barriers
against most approaches to regulating intermediaries.130 Conventional First
Amendment doctrine, constrained by the state action principle that grounds
most constitutional rights, refuses to confront conflicts between speech
interests. Like an old formula Western, the doctrine requires a good guy and
a bad guy: a putatively censored speaker and the putatively censorious
government. The rigid, parallel distinctions of public from private and of
censors from speakers have always limited First Amendment law’s
responsiveness to speech controversies and distorted how legal doctrine
reflects the values that animate constitutional speech protection.131 First
Amendment law insulates speech intermediaries to pursue profit while
129. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
130. See Chandler, supra note 93, at 1124–29 (evaluating against First Amendment
concerns various proposals for regulating intermediaries); Tutt, supra note 122, at 272–86
(discussing elements of First Amendment doctrine that impede intermediary regulation);
Yemini, supra note 90, at 13–32 (same); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of
the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 697–703
(2010) (praising present First Amendment doctrine as a barrier to regulations of speech
intermediaries).
131. See Magarian, supra note 127, at 191–93; Gregory P. Magarian, The First
Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime
Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 135–146 (2004).
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shielding them from social obligations. That’s why Television Age critics
of speech intermediation sought to move First Amendment doctrine in a
direction that would allow greater regulation of intermediaries132 or
affirmatively subject them to constitutional free speech obligations.133
Those critics saw the need to change First Amendment law in order to
promote free speech values.
The contrast between Miami Herald v. Tornillo and Red Lion reveals an
apparent distinction the Television Age Supreme Court drew between
newspapers’ axiomatic editorial integrity and broadcasters’ more crassly
commercial priorities.134 No one ever denied, however, that broadcasters,
by creating and disseminating content, were speakers in some important
sense. It’s hard to find the same expressive character in Comcast, Google,
or Facebook. These new intermediaries all convey information, but
autonomous third parties—individual users and creators—produce the
information the intermediaries convey.135 Most online intermediaries don’t
even actively select those users and creators, as cable systems select
channels.136 Rather, the new intermediaries flourish by making their
services generally available.137 “The very term ‘intermediaries,’ as opposed
to ‘the press,’” notes Rebecca Tushnet, “emphasizes that aggregators,
compilers, and other more passive conduits are not themselves the source of
speech.”138 First Amendment interests of online intermediaries generally
derive from the interests of their users. Granting First Amendment
protection to intermediated online speech presents little problem when
intermediaries and their users stand in common cause against government
efforts to censor speech that the users make or seek and the intermediaries

132. See, e.g., BAKER, MEDIA, supra note 61, at 63.
133. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 68, at 1662–63.
134. Compare 418 U.S. 241 (1974) with 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
135. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 114.
136. See id. at 115.
137. Online intermediaries vary substantially in how they organize, channel, and promote
content. Thorough First Amendment analysis of any regulatory proposal would need to
consider the particular attributes and practices of the regulated intermediaries. See, e.g.,
Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1670 (suggesting that the constitutionality of regulating
intermediaries as common carriers might vary with different intermediaries’ degrees of
editorial intervention in the content they carry).
138. Tushnet, supra note 84, at 988; see also Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1654.
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carry.139 The situation changes dramatically when the interests of
intermediaries and users diverge.
Other commentators, however, have sought to bring ISPs within the First
Amendment’s protection for intermediaries’ editorial discretion.140 For
example, Jonathan Zittrain justifies strong First Amendment protections for
online intermediaries by characterizing them as “content curators.” 141
Meanwhile, courts have strengthened the foundation for treating
intermediaries as First Amendment speakers. While intermediaries have
grown more powerful and harder to restrain, First Amendment doctrine has
grown more formalistic in its reflexive concern for wealthy and privileged
speakers.142 The “fourth estate” justification for imposing social obligations
on the news media (whatever entities that category now includes) has gone
the way of eight-track tapes.143 The hardening of the public-private
distinction in First Amendment law presents a particularly rough thicket for
reform efforts.144
I have argued elsewhere that the Roberts Court’s version of First
Amendment doctrine protects the speech interests of powerful, established
institutions while letting the government restrict much speech from the
social and political margins.145 This approach to the First Amendment,
which I call “managed speech,” promotes a conservative ideal of social and
political stability while stifling dynamism in public discourse.146 The Court
doesn’t simply favor wealthy and powerful speakers and disfavor poor and
marginal speakers; rather, it enlists the former as guardians of a social order
threatened by the latter. Managed speech reinforces First Amendment
doctrine’s preference for the interests of online speech intermediaries over
139. An example of this scenario is a federal court’s recent holding that the President
violated the First Amendment when he blocked Twitter followers who criticized him. See
Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 5205 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018).
140. See Yemini, supra note 90, at 17–20; Yoo, supra note 130, at 742–45.
141. Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever
Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/
information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering.
142. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1119 (2015).
143. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Judith Miller, 397 F. 3d 964, 968–72 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (taking a narrow view of journalists’ legal latitude to protect the identities of
confidential sources).
144. See Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1667–72; Tutt, supra note 122, at 265–66.
145. See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST
AMENDMENT (2017).
146. See id. at xiv–xvi (introducing the managed speech conception of First Amendment
jurisprudence).
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those of individual users.147 Intermediaries are exactly the sort of
formidable institutions whose speech interests the Roberts Court values
most.148 This Court’s limited forays into new media First Amendment
issues consistently resist government regulation.149 Down the road,
however, online intermediaries’ promotion of social fragmentation could
conceivably set managed speech’s methodology of empowering the
powerful against its mission of reifying stability.
The absence online of the spectrum scarcity often portrayed as animating
Television Age broadcast regulations eliminates a conventional justification
for imposing substantive regulations on speech intermediaries. The Internet
Age, however, features its own scarcity.150 The proliferation of available
information has exposed the importance of audience attention as a scarce
resource in today’s system of free expression.151 Attention scarcity allows
for the aggressive use of information overload as a tool for drowning out
other speech.152 In addition, the Internet Age has continued—and even
exacerbated—the Television Age pattern of concentrated intermediary
ownership.153 Old media entities have carried their concentrations of
ownership with them to the internet.154 As for the new speech
intermediaries, the roster of dominant ISPs, search engines, and social
media sites looks barely more extensive or diverse than the “big three”
networks and other concentrated intermediaries of the Television Age.
147. See MAGARIAN, supra note 145, at 227–53.
148. See id. at 252–53.
149. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732–33 (2017) (striking down
a ban on registered sex offenders’ access to social media sites); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798–805 (2011) (striking down a ban on selling violent video games to
minors); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572–79 (2011) (striking down a ban on
drug makers’ use of mined prescription data as a marketing tool).
150. I don’t mean to argue, and I don’t believe, that physical scarcity is a necessary
precondition for media regulation. Cf., e.g., Sunstein, supra note 116, at 1764–65
(advocating a normative conception of First Amendment law without regard to spectrum
scarcity).
151. See BAKER, CONCENTRATION, supra note 46, at 101–10 (analyzing audience
concentration on the Internet); Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content
Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failure of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1389 (2004).
152. See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Sept.
2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete.
153. See BAKER, MEDIA, supra note 61, at 285–307; Tushnet, supra note 84, at 992–93;
see also Morant, supra note 48,, at 979–84 (advocating a conception of scarcity that counts
only the dominant media sources from which most people get information).
154. See BAKER, CONCENTRATION, supra note 46, at 111–12.
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Despite the threats that attention scarcity and ownership concentration pose
to free speech, we face a severe disconnect between what First Amendment
doctrine permits and what a socially constructive account of free speech
principles compels.
We need a First Amendment doctrine that can advance a regime of
speech intermediation to serve the public interest. The doctrinal path could
lead in any of several directions.155 We could seek to persuade courts to
impose affirmative First Amendment obligations on speech intermediaries.
Alternatively, we could seek to persuade courts to construe the First
Amendment as letting Congress and administrative agencies regulate
intermediaries in public-regarding ways. Those regulations might focus on
broad structural reforms. Recall how structural regulations in the Television
Age distinctively countered intermediaries’ tendency to promote
homogeneity. One familiar structural approach would be to treat
intermediaries as common carriers, as the net neutrality principle treats
ISPs. A different structural approach could invoke pro-competitive
principles to subject dominant intermediaries to greater market
competition,156 although economic qualities of the internet would pose
substantial challenges to anti-monopolistic reforms.157 Alternatively, a
substantive regulatory strategy might compel intermediaries to monitor
content based on accuracy, privacy, or harm-based concerns. That sort of
strategy could entail relaxing or ending online intermediaries’ CDA
immunity. Whatever path we follow, if we want Internet Age speech
intermediation not just to maximize private profit but to serve some
conception of the public good, we need to rethink First Amendment
doctrine.
B. Reconciling Social Cohesion and Dynamic Engagement
The profitmaking function of speech intermediation presents the same
problems in the Internet Age that it presented in the Television Age. Speech
intermediaries are private companies that exist to make money. From the
perspectives of all but the most convinced right-wing libertarians,
intermediaries’ profits are at best incidental and at worst contrary to
society’s well-being. The early cyberoptimists were right to understand the
155. See supra notes 117–128 and accompanying text.
156. Cf. STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1988).
157. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 439–43 (2000) (discussing the importance
of economies of scale, network benefits, and market entry costs for the emergence of
dominant online intermediaries).
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internet’s technology as creating a far broader set of possibilities than the
Television Age ever offered for how public discourse can work. We should
maintain a healthy skepticism about the political and legal mechanisms by
which we impose social obligations on intermediaries. However, we have
good reasons to hope that the lessons of the past and the innovations of the
present will help the Internet Age improve over the substantive results of
regulating speech intermediaries in the Television Age.
What kind of social structure should we aim for Internet Age speech
intermediaries to promote? One of the abiding challenges of public
discourse in a democratic society is to reconcile the values of social
cohesion and dynamic engagement. Members of a community need
common frames of reference to help them engage with one another and
participate together in political and social processes. At the same time,
democratic politics and societal progress depend on the ability and
willingness of everyone in the community to question what we think we
know.158 Social cohesion and dynamic engagement provide complementary
benefits for public discourse. At the same time, the two values elementally
conflict. Too much cohesion brings a stultifying conformity that can dull
the critical edge of political debate. Conversely, an overly sensitive critical
trigger can curdle dynamic engagement into nihilistic cynicism, corroding
public discussion by preventing any meaningful consensus.
Speech intermediation in the Television Age overvalued uniformity in
public discourse at a steep cost to dynamic engagement. The broadcast
television networks, along with other speech intermediaries, homogenized
debate and flattened difference. The image of the world they beamed into
everyone’s brains was oppressively white, aggressively male, reflexively
middle class and gentile, and thoughtlessly straight and cisgender. Their
politics congealed in a mushy center.
People in the Television Age, of course, frequently disagreed with one
another and assessed public issues critically. Most vividly, social
movements against the Vietnam War, racial apartheid, and subordination of
women forcefully challenged settled allocations of power. For the most
part, however, efforts to destabilize prevailing ideas worked against the
dominant speech intermediaries, not through them. We can be grateful that
the internet’s technological infrastructure makes Television Age
intermediaries’ pressure toward conformity impossible for online

158. This dichotomy is a variation on what Robert Post calls “the paradox of public
discourse.” ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 147–48 (1995).
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intermediaries to replicate. Even so, our present vantage point suggests that
Television Age critics may not have sufficiently valued the social
responsibilities that period’s regulations and norms imposed on speech
intermediaries. Journalistic standards and ethical codes, for instance, look
very appealing in an age of fake news and filter bubbles.
Our society has grown more contentious in the Internet Age for many
reasons, some of them laudable. Today we have greater access to more
information and a broader range of viewpoints, causing inevitable
divergences between different people’s bases of knowledge. People divided
by continents, with radically different cultural and political values, can
engage or confront one another as easily as if they met across a backyard
fence. Liberation movements have brought members of marginalized
groups greater agency and autonomy, increasing social and cultural
heterogeneity. The shift from the old to the new speech intermediaries has
aided these positive developments by lowering entry costs into public
discourse. Unfortunately, online intermediaries have also helped to erode
social cohesion in less beneficent ways, mainly by accelerating the
customization of truth. The Internet Age indulges biases to virtually no
end—or to no virtual end.
Even as the customization of truth weakens social cohesion, it
simultaneously garbles dynamic engagement. When you live in an echo
chamber, you lose any reason to believe you might be wrong. You therefore
lose any motive to interrogate your beliefs. Customized truth creates false
certainty. People who get most of their knowledge from their like-minded
friends and followers on Facebook and Twitter may forget how to look for
other sides of a story. At worst, we become susceptible to an absurd degree
of faith in the public figures and ideas that we’ve favored all along and an
automatic willingness to believe the worst about the people and ideas we’ve
opposed. Customized truth makes sense from a commercial standpoint: the
ability to micro-target goods and services based on preexisting preferences
is great for business. It’s not so great for democracy.
Comparison of Television and Internet Age speech intermediation should
reassure us that both epochs’ critics had sound reasons for their contrasting
complaints. The expressive infrastructure of the Mass Media Era has never
delivered a healthy balance between social cohesion and dynamic
engagement. The Television Age overvalued uniformity; the Internet Age
has degraded both qualities. Reasonable (and unreasonable) people will, of
course, disagree normatively about where the optimal balance falls. The
problem is sufficiently abstract and complex to make it very difficult. The
importance of the outcome justifies the effort.
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Conclusion
Speech intermediation will always be necessary in our massive, complex,
diverse society. The essential questions about speech intermediaries are
what shapes they’ll take under different social and technological conditions
and in which directions they’ll move public discourse. In the Television
Age, speech intermediaries were huge, concentrated institutions that kept
most speakers from mass audiences and pushed society toward numbing
conformity. Law and public norms regulated and influenced intermediaries’
behavior in ways that generally exacerbated their homogenizing tendencies.
In the Internet Age, intermediaries are huge, concentrated institutions that
give many speakers access to mass audiences and push society toward
chaotic fragmentation. We indulge their profit-motivated autonomy in ways
that let them degrade social cohesion and dynamic engagement all at once.
One key difference between Television Age and Internet Age speech
intermediation is the content of First Amendment law. Our retreat from
regulation has something to do with the technological qualities of online
speech intermediaries, but it also has a lot to do with a doctrine that has
shifted toward an overbearing solicitude for powerful institutions. If we
want intermediaries to serve the public good, then we need to change First
Amendment law, whether incrementally to permit regulation of
intermediaries or radically to compel them to promote free speech values. If
we can fix the doctrine, then we have to figure out what kind of public
discourse we want intermediaries to foster. The excesses of Television Age
homogeneity and Internet Age fragmentation, viewed together, commend
the middle ground: a healthy balance between social cohesion and dynamic
engagement. May the lessons of our past help guide us to a brighter future.
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